In developmental biology, the term 'totipotency' seems to have lost its conceptual selectivity. In (patent) law, the ECJ has completely avoided to resort to 'totipotency' as a normative criterion recently. Against this background the project will analyze in close cooperation with philosophical and natural scientific partners legal aspects (1) of the endpoint of the developmental potential of human embryonic entities (necessity of an enpoint; classification of parthenotes; challenges of empirical uncertainty specifically in criminal law), (2) of the differentiation between 'naturalness' and 'artificialty' of human embryonic entities (legal doctrinal and theoretical justification of such a differentiation; relationship between both technical manipulation and assistence as well as internal constitution for the purpose of normative evaluation of such entities) as well as (3) of the status of 'totipotent non-embryos' (imperatives or prohibitions concerning treatment of 'totipotent non-embryos').